ns correspond
to the 'physical sanction,' and are those (1) of the 'senses,' (2) of
wealth, _i.e._ caused by the possession of things, and (3) of 'skill,'
_i.e._ caused by our ability to use things. Pleasures caused by persons
indirectly correspond first to the 'popular or moral sanction,' and are
pleasures (4) of 'amity,' caused by the goodwill of individuals, and (5)
of a 'good name,' caused by the goodwill of people in general; secondly,
to 'political sanction,' namely (6) pleasures of 'power'; and thirdly,
to the 'religious sanction,' or (7) pleasures of 'piety.' All these are
'self-regarding pleasures.' The pleasures caused directly by the
pleasure of others are those (8) of 'benevolence,' and (9) of
malevolence. We then have what is really a cross division by classes of
'derivative' pleasures; these being due to (10) memory, (11)
imagination, (12) expectation, (13) association. To each class of
pleasures corresponds a class of pains, except that there are no pains
corresponding to the pleasures of wealth or power. We have, however, a
general class of pains of 'privation,' which might include pains of
poverty or weakness: and to these are opposed (14) pleasures of
'relief,' _i.e._ of the privation of pains. In the _Table_, as
separately published, Bentham modified this by dividing pleasures of
sense into three classes, the last of which includes the two first; by
substituting pleasures of 'curiosity' for pleasures of 'skill' by
suppressing pleasures of relief and pains of privation; and by adding,
as a class of 'pains' without corresponding pleasures, pains (1) of
labour, (2) of 'death, and bodily pains in general.' These changes seem
to have been introduced in the course of writing his _Introduction_,
where they are partly assumed. Another class is added to include all
classes of 'self-regarding pleasures or pains.' He is trying to give a
list of all 'synonyms' for various pains and pleasures, and has
therefore to admit classes corresponding to general names which include
other classes.
[392] _Works_ i. 210, where he speaks of pleasures of the 'ball-room,'
the 'theatre,' and the 'fine arts' as derivable from the 'simple and
elementary' pleasures.
[393] _Works_ ('Morals and Legislation'), i. 22 etc.
[394] _Ibid._ i. 33.
[395] _Morals and Legislation_, ch. vii. to xi.
III. THE SANCTIONS
Let us first take his definitions of the fundamental conceptions. All
action of reasonable beings implies the expec
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