e a scourge in America.

We have thus our 'pathology' or theory of the passive sensibilities of
man. We know what are the 'springs of action,' how they vary in general,
and how they vary from one man to another. We can therefore pass to the
dynamics.[395] We have described the machinery in rest, and can now
consider it in motion. We proceed as before by first considering action
in general: which leads to consideration of the 'intention' and the
'motive' implied by any conscious action: and hence of the relation of
these to the 'springs of action' as already described. The discussion is
minute and elaborate; and Bentham improves as he comes nearer to the
actual problems of legislation and further from the ostensible bases of
psychology. The analysis of conduct, and of the sanctions by which
conduct is modified, involves a view of morals and of the relations
between the spheres of morality and legislation which is of critical
importance for the whole Utilitarian creed. 'Moral laws' and a 'Positive
law' both affect human action. How do they differ? Bentham's treatment
of the problem shows, I think, a clearer appreciation of some
difficulties than might be inferred from his later utterances. In any
case, it brings into clear relief a moral doctrine which deeply affected
his successors.

NOTES:

[387] _Works_, i. 205; and Dumont's _Traites_ (1820), i. xxv, xxvi. The
word 'springs of action' perhaps comes from the marginal note to the
above-mentioned passage of Locke (bk. ii. chap. xxvi, Sec. 41, 42).

[388] _Morals and Legislation_, chaps. iv., v., vi.

[389] See 'Codification Proposal' (_Works_, iv. 540), where Bentham
takes money as representing pleasure, and shows how the present value
may be calculated like that of a sum put out to interest. The same
assumption is often made by Political Economists in regard to
'utilities.'

[390] _Works_ ('Morals and Legislation'), i. 17 _n._

[391] It is not worth while to consider this at length; but I give the
following conjectural account of the list as it appears in the _Morals
and Legislation_ above. In classifying pain or pleasures, Bentham is, I
think, following the clue suggested by his 'sanctions.' He is really
classifying according to their causes or the way in which they are
'annexed.' Thus pleasures may or may not be dependent upon other
persons, or if upon other persons, may be indirectly or directly caused
by their pleasures or pains. Pleasures not caused by perso