etc.; 289, etc.

[372] _Ibid._ viii. 106.

[373] 'Codify' was one of Bentham's successful neologisms.

[374] _Works_ ('Logic'), viii. 220.

[375] Here Bentham coincides with Horne Tooke, to whose 'discoveries' he
refers in the _Chrestomathia_ (_Works_, viii. 120, 185, 188).

[376] _Works_, iii. 286; viii. 119.

[377] _Ibid._ ('Ontology') viii. 196 _n._

[378] _Ibid._ viii, 197 _n._

[379] _Ibid._ viii. 263.

[380] _Works_ ('Ontology'), viii. 119.

[381] _Ibid._ viii. 198.

[382] _Ibid._ viii. 199.

[383] _Ibid._ viii. 206, 247.

[384] Helvetius adds to this that the only real pains and pleasures are
the physical, but Bentham does not follow him here. See Helvetius,
_OEuvres_ (1781), ii. 121, etc.

[385] _Works_, i. 211 ('Springs of Action').

[386] _Ibid._ i. 206.

II. SPRINGS OF ACTION

Our path is now clear. Pains and pleasures give us what mathematicians
call the 'independent variable.' Our units are (in Bentham's phrase)
'lots' of pain or pleasure. We have to interpret all the facts in terms
of pain or pleasure, and we shall have the materials for what has since
been called a 'felicific calculus.' To construct this with a view to
legislation is his immediate purpose. The theory will fall into two
parts: the 'pathological,' or an account of all the pains and pleasures
which are the primary data; and the 'dynamical,' or an account of the
various modes of conduct determined by expectations of pain and
pleasure. This gives the theory of 'springs of action,' considered in
themselves, and of 'motives,' that is, of the springs as influencing
conduct.[387] The 'pathology' contains, in the first place, a discussion
of the measure of pain and pleasure in general; secondly, a discussion
of the various species of pain and pleasure; and thirdly, a discussion
of the varying sensibilities of different individuals to pain and
pleasure.[388] Thus under the first head, we are told that the value of
a pleasure, considered by itself, depends upon its intensity, duration,
certainty, and propinquity; and, considered with regard to modes of
obtaining it, upon its fecundity (or tendency to produce other pains and
pleasures) and its purity (or freedom from admixture of other pains and
pleasures). The pain or pleasure is thus regarded as an entity which is
capable of being in some sense weighed and measured.[389] The next step
is to classify pains and pleasures, which though commensurable as
psychological forces, hav