rity of his own method: for, as between the two,
Bentham's position is at least the most coherent and intelligible.

Blackstone, however, represents little more than a bit of rhetoric
embodying fragments of inconsistent theories. The _Morals and
Legislation_ opens by briefly and contemptuously setting aside more
philosophical opponents of Utilitarianism. The 'ascetic' principle, for
example, is the formal contradiction of the principle of Utility, for it
professedly declares pleasure to be evil. Could it be consistently
carried out it would turn earth into hell. But in fact it is at bottom
an illegitimate corollary from the very principle which it ostensibly
denies. It professes to condemn pleasure in general; it really means
that certain pleasures can only be bought at an excessive cost of pain.
Other theories are contrivances for avoiding the appeal 'to any external
standard'; and in substance, therefore, they make the opinion of the
individual theorist an ultimate and sufficient reason. Adam Smith by his
doctrine of 'sympathy' makes the sentiment of approval itself the
ultimate standard. My feeling echoes yours, and reciprocally; each
cannot derive authority from the other. Another man (Hutcheson) invents
a thing made on purpose to tell him what is right and what is wrong and
calls it a 'moral sense.' Beattie substitutes 'common' for 'moral'
sense, and his doctrine is attractive because every man supposes himself
to possess common sense. Others, like Price, appeal to the
Understanding, or, like Clarke, to the 'Fitness of Things,' or they
invent such phrases as 'Law of Nature,' or 'Right Reason' or 'Natural
Justice,' or what you please. Each really means that whatever he says
is infallibly true and self-evident. Wollaston discovers that the only
wrong thing is telling a lie; or that when you kill your father, it is a
way of saying that he is not your father, and the same method is
applicable to any conduct which he happens to dislike. The 'fairest and
openest of them all' is the man who says, 'I am of the number of the
Elect'; God tells the Elect what is right: therefore if you want to know
what is right, you have only to come to me.[363] Bentham is writing here
in his pithiest style. His criticism is of course of the rough and ready
order; but I think that in a fashion he manages to hit the nail pretty
well on the head.

His main point, at any rate, is clear. He argues briefly that the
alternative systems are illuso