ical' sanctions are such pleasures and pains as
follow a given course of conduct independently of the interference of
any other human or supernatural being; the 'political' those which are
annexed by the action of the legislator; the 'moral or popular' those
which are annexed by other individuals not acting in a corporate
capacity; and the 'religious' those which are annexed by a 'superior
invisible being,' or, as he says elsewhere,[366] 'such as are capable of
being expected at the hands of an invisible Ruler of the Universe.' The
three last sanctions, he remarks, 'operate through the first.' The
'magistrate' or 'men at large' can only operate, and God is supposed
only to operate, 'through the powers of nature,' that is, by applying
some of the pains and pleasures which may also be natural sanctions. A
man is burnt: if by his own imprudence, that is a 'physical' sanction;
if by the magistrate, it is a 'political' sanction; if by some neglect
of his neighbours, due to their dislike of his 'moral character,' a
'moral' sanction; if by the immediate act of God or by distraction
caused by dread of God's displeasure, it is a 'religious' sanction. Of
these, as Bentham characteristically observes[367] in a later writing
the political is much stronger than the 'moral' or 'religious.' Many men
fear the loss of character or the 'wrath of Heaven,' but all men fear
the scourge and the gallows.[368] He admits, however, that the religious
sanction and the additional sanction of 'benevolence' have the advantage
of not requiring that the offender should be found out.[369] But in any
case, the 'natural' and religious sanctions are beyond the legislator's
power. His problem, therefore, is simply this: what sanctions ought he
to annex to conduct, or remembering that 'ought' means simply 'conducive
to happiness,' what political sanctions will increase happiness?

To answer this fully will be to give a complete system of legislation;
but in order to answer it we require a whole logical and psychological
apparatus. Bentham shows this apparatus at work, but does not expound
its origin in any separate treatise. Enough information, however, is
given as to his method in the curious collection of the fragments
connected with the _Chrestomathia_. A logical method upon which he
constantly insisted is that of 'bipartition,'[370] called also the
'dichotomous' or 'bifurcate' method, and exemplified by the so-called
'Porphyrian Tree.' The principle is,