though
much impeded, advanced securely through Ohio and Indiana to the shores
of Lake Erie, and there maintained themselves in supplies sent
over-country; whereas the British at the western end of the lake,
opposite Detroit, depended wholly upon the water, although no hostile
force threatened the land line between them and Ontario. The battle of
Lake Erie, so disastrous to their cause, was forced upon them purely
by failure of food, owing to the appearance of Perry's squadron.

From Lake Superior to the head of the first rapid of the St. Lawrence,
therefore, the control of the water was the decisive factor in the
general military situation. Both on the upper lakes, where water
communication from Sault Sainte Marie to Niagara was unbroken, and on
Ontario, separated from the others by the falls of Niagara, the
British had at the outset a slight superiority, but not beyond the
power of the United States to overtake and outpass. Throughout the
rapids, to Montreal, military conditions resembled those which
confront a general charged with the passage of any great river. If
undertaken at all, such an enterprise requires the deceiving of the
opponent as to the place and time when the attempt will be made, the
careful provision of means and disposition of men for instant
execution, and finally the prompt and decisive seizure of opportunity,
to transfer and secure on the opposite shore a small body, capable of
maintaining itself until the bulk of the army can cross to its
support. Nothing of the sort was attempted here, or needed to be
undertaken in this war. Naval superiority determined the ability to
cross above the rapids, and there was no occasion to consider the
question of crossing between them. Immediately below the last lay
Montreal, accessible to sea-going vessels from the ocean. To that
point, therefore, the sea power of Great Britain reached, and there it
ended.

The United States Government was conscious of its great potential
superiority over Canada, in men and in available resources. So
evident, indeed, was the disparity, that the prevalent feeling was not
one of reasonable self-reliance, but of vainglorious self-confidence;
of dependence upon mere bulk and weight to crush an opponent, quite
irrespective of preparation or skill, and disregardful of the factor
of military efficiency. Jefferson's words have already been quoted.
Calhoun, then a youthful member of Congress, and a foremost advocate
of the war, said in