ctions
of Hawke, Boscawen, and Anson, though they still occur at times, are
for the most part succeeded by wary and complicated manoeuvres, too
often barren of decisive results as naval battles, which are the
prevailing characteristic of this coming war. The superior tactical
science of the French succeeded in imparting to this conflict that
peculiar feature of their naval policy, which subordinated the control
of the sea by the destruction of the enemy's fleets, of his organized
naval forces, to the success of particular operations, the retention
of particular points, the carrying out of particular ulterior
strategic ends. It is not necessary to endeavor to force upon others
the conviction of the present writer that such a policy, however
applicable as an exception, is faulty as a rule; but it is most
desirable that all persons responsible for the conduct of naval
affairs should recognize that the two lines of policy, in direct
contradiction to each other, do exist. In the one there is a strict
analogy to a war of posts; while in the other the objective is that
force whose destruction leaves the posts unsupported and therefore
sure to fall in due time. These opposing policies being recognized,
consideration should also be had of the results of the two as
exemplified in the history of England and France.

It was not, however, with such cautious views that the new king at
first sought to impress his admirals. In the instructions addressed to
the Count d'Orvilliers, commanding the first fleet sent out from
Brest, the minister, speaking in the name of the king, says:--

"Your duty now is to restore to the French flag the lustre with
which it once shone; past misfortunes and faults must be buried
out of sight; only by the most illustrious actions can the navy
hope to succeed in doing this. His Majesty has the right to
expect the greatest efforts from his officers.... Under whatever
circumstances the king's fleet may be placed, his Majesty's
orders, which he expressly charges me to impress upon you, as
well as upon all officers in command, are that his ships attack
with the greatest vigor, and defend themselves, on all
occasions, to the last extremity."

More follows to the same effect; upon which a French officer, who has
not before been quoted in connection with this phase of French naval
policy, says:--

"How different this language from that held to our admirals
durin