e
single-handed almost without allies, France having powerful
auxiliaries. She had conquered solely by the superiority of her
government."

Yes! but by the superiority of her government using the tremendous
weapon of her sea power. This made her rich, and in turn protected the
trade by which she had her wealth. With her money she upheld her few
auxiliaries, mainly Prussia and Hanover, in their desperate strife.
Her power was everywhere that her ships could reach, and there was
none to dispute the sea to her. Where she would she went, and with her
went her guns and her troops. By this mobility her forces were
multiplied, those of her enemies distracted. Ruler of the seas, she
everywhere obstructed its highways. The enemies' fleets could not
join; no great fleet could get out, or if it did, it was only to meet
at once, with uninured officers and crews, those who were veterans in
gales and warfare. Save in the case of Minorca, she carefully held her
own sea-bases and eagerly seized those of the enemy. What a lion in
the path was Gibraltar to the French squadrons of Toulon and Brest!
What hope for French succor to Canada, when the English fleet had
Louisburg under its lee?

The one nation that gained in this war was that which used the sea in
peace to earn its wealth, and ruled it in war by the extent of its
navy, by the number of its subjects who lived on the sea or by the
sea, and by its numerous bases of operations scattered over the globe.
Yet it must be observed that these bases themselves would have lost
their value if their communications remained obstructed. Therefore the
French lost Louisburg, Martinique, Pondicherry; so England herself
lost Minorca. The service between the bases and the mobile force
between the ports and the fleets is mutual.[112] In this respect the
navy is essentially a light corps; it keeps open the communications
between its own ports, it obstructs those of the enemy; but it sweeps
the sea for the service of the land, it controls the desert that man
may live and thrive on the habitable globe.

FOOTNOTES:

[93] That is, with the guns on board, but for the most part not
mounted on their carriages, in order to give increased accommodation
for troops. When the troops were landed, the guns were mounted.

[94] Ramatuelle: Tactique Navale.

[95] Lapeyrouse-Bonfils: Hist. de la Marine.

[96] Clerk: Naval Tactics.

[97] Jurien de la Graviere: Guerres Maritimes.

[98] Mahon: His