tory of England.

[99] Mahon: History of England.

[100] For these, see Troude: Batailles Navales.

[101] See Plate VIII.

[102] Troude: Batailles Navales de la France.

[103] Lapeyrouse-Bonfils.

[104] Mahon: History of England.

[105] Campbell: Lives of the Admirals.

[106] Mahon: History of England.

[107] Martin: History of France.

[108] Martin: History of France.

[109] Campbell: Lives of the Admirals.

[110] See Annual Register, 1762, p. 63

[111] Campbell: Lives of the Admirals.

[112] These remarks, always true, are doubly so now since the
introduction of steam. The renewal of coal is a want more frequent,
more urgent, more peremptory, than any known to the sailing-ship. It
is vain to look for energetic naval operations distant from coal
stations. It is equally vain to acquire distant coaling stations
without maintaining a powerful navy; they will but fall into the hands
of the enemy. But the vainest of all delusions is the expectation of
bringing down an enemy by commerce-destroying alone, with no coaling
stations outside the national boundaries.

CHAPTER IX.

COURSE OF EVENTS FROM THE PEACE OF PARIS TO 1778.--MARITIME WAR
CONSEQUENT UPON THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION.--SEA BATTLE OFF USHANT.

If England had reason to complain that she had not reaped from the
Treaty of Paris all the advantages that her military achievements and
position entitled her to expect, France had every cause for discontent
at the position in which the war left her. The gain of England was
nearly measured by her losses; even the cession of Florida, made to
the conqueror by Spain, had been bought by France at the price of
Louisiana. Naturally the thoughts of her statesmen and of her people,
as they bent under the present necessity to bear the burden of the
vanquished, turned to the future with its possibilities of revenge and
compensation. The Duc de Choiseul, able though imperious, remained for
many years more at the head of affairs, and worked persistently to
restore the power of France from the effects of the treaty. The
Austrian alliance had been none of his seeking; it was already made
and working when he came to office in 1758; but he had even at the
first recognized that the chief enemy was England, and tried as far as
could be to direct the forces of the nation against her. The defeat of
Conflans having thwarted his projects of invasion, he next sought, in
entire consistency with his main purpose,