n make enemies. Facts of this
kind are asserted by witnesses whose truthfulness is above
suspicion."[113]

Insubordination of this character, to which weaker men gave way,
dashed in vain against the resolute and fiery temper of Suffren; but
the spirit of discontent rose almost to the height of mutiny, causing
him to say in his despatches to the minister of the navy, after his
fourth battle: "My heart is pierced by the most general defection. It
is frightful to think that I might four times have destroyed the
English fleet, and that it still exists." Choiseul's reforms broke
against this rock, which only the uprising of the whole nation finally
removed; but in the personnel of the crews a great improvement was
made. In 1767 he reorganized the artillery of the fleet, forming a
body of ten thousand gunners, who were systematically drilled once a
week during the ten years still to intervene before the next war with
England.

Losing sight of no part of his plans, Choiseul, while promoting the
naval and military power of France, paid special attention to the
alliance with Spain and judiciously encouraged and furthered the
efforts of that country in the path of progress under Charles III.,
the best of her kings of the Bourbon line. The Austrian alliance still
existing was maintained, but his hopes were chiefly fixed upon Spain.
The wisdom and insight which had at once fastened upon England as the
centre of enmity to France had been justified and further enlightened
by the whole course of the Seven Years' War. In Spain was the surest,
and, with good administration, the most powerful ally. The close
proximity of the two countries, the relative positions of their ports,
made the naval situation particularly strong; and the alliance which
was dictated by sound policy, by family ties, and by just fear of
England's sea power, was further assured to France by recent and still
existing injuries that must continue to rankle with Spain. Gibraltar,
Minorca, and Florida were still in the hands of England; no Spaniard
could be easy till this reproach was wiped out.

It may be readily believed, as is asserted by French historians, that
England viewed with disquietude the growth of the French navy, and
would gladly have nipped it betimes; but it is more doubtful whether
she would have been willing to force a war for that purpose. During
the years succeeding the Peace of Paris a succession of short
ministries, turning mainly upon