level of the
great opportunity, was out of favor at court.

Nevertheless, the gains of England were very great, not only in
territorial increase, nor yet in maritime preponderance, but in the
prestige and position achieved in the eyes of the nations, now fully
opened to her great resources and mighty power. To these results, won
by the sea, the issue of the continental war offered a singular and
suggestive contrast. France had already withdrawn, along with
England, from all share in that strife, and peace between the other
parties to it was signed five days after the Peace of Paris. The terms
of the peace were simply the _status quo ante bellum_. By the estimate
of the King of Prussia, one hundred and eighty thousand of his
soldiers had fallen or died in this war, out of a kingdom of five
million souls; while the losses of Russia, Austria, and France
aggregated four hundred and sixty thousand men. The result was simply
that things remained as they were.[110] To attribute this only to a
difference between the possibilities of land and sea war is of course
absurd. The genius of Frederick, backed by the money of England, had
proved an equal match for the mismanaged and not always hearty efforts
of a coalition numerically overwhelming. What does seem a fair
conclusion is, that States having a good seaboard, or even ready
access to the ocean by one or two outlets, will find it to their
advantage to seek prosperity and extension by the way of the sea and
of commerce, rather than in attempts to unsettle and modify existing
political arrangements in countries where a more or less long
possession of power has conferred acknowledged rights, and created
national allegiance or political ties. Since the Treaty of Paris in
1763, the waste places of the world have been rapidly filled; witness
our own continent, Australia, and even South America. A nominal and
more or less clearly defined political possession now generally exists
in the most forsaken regions, though to this statement there are some
marked exceptions; but in many places this political possession is
little more than nominal, and in others of a character so feeble that
it cannot rely upon itself alone for support or protection. The
familiar and notorious example of the Turkish Empire, kept erect only
by the forces pressing upon it from opposing sides, by the mutual
jealousies of powers that have no sympathy with it, is an instance of
such weak political tenure; and thoug