ea power.

Besides the operations on the North American continent already
described, this plan was fourfold:--

1. The French Atlantic ports were watched in force, especially Brest,
so as to keep the great fleets or small squadrons from getting out
without fighting.

2. Attacks were made upon the Atlantic and Channel coasts with flying
squadrons, followed at times by the descent of small bodies of troops.
These attacks, the direction of which could not be foreseen by the
enemy, were chiefly intended to compel him to keep on hand forces at
many points, and so to diminish the army acting against the King of
Prussia. While the tendency would certainly be that way, it may be
doubted whether the actual diversion in favor of Frederick was of much
consequence. No particular mention will be made of these operations,
which had but little visible effect upon the general course of the
war.

3. A fleet was kept in the Mediterranean and near Gibraltar to prevent
the French Toulon fleet from getting round to the Atlantic. It does
not appear that any attempt was seriously made to stop communications
between France and Minorca. The action of the Mediterranean fleet,
though an independent command, was subsidiary to that in the Atlantic.

4. Distant foreign expeditions were sent against the French colonies
in the West India Islands and on the coast of Africa, and a squadron
was maintained in the East Indies to secure the control of those seas,
thereby supporting the English in the Peninsula, and cutting off the
communications of the French. These operations in distant waters,
never intermitted, assumed greater activity and larger proportions
after the destruction of the French navy had relieved England from the
fear of invasion, and when the ill-advised entrance of Spain into the
war, in 1762, offered yet richer prizes to her enterprise.

The close blockade of the enemy's fleet in Brest, which was first
systematically carried out during this war, may be considered rather a
defensive than an offensive operation; for though the intention
certainly was to fight if opportunity offered, the chief object was to
neutralize an offensive weapon in the enemy's hands; the destruction
of the weapon was secondary. The truth of this remark is shown by the
outburst of fear and anger which swept over England when an
unavoidable absence of the blockading fleet in 1759 allowed the French
to escape. The effect of the blockade in this and after wars