out frigates at intervals, and to arrange
signals by guns to notify him betimes of the enemy's approach. Taking
advantage of his absence, and in obedience to orders, the French
commodore, De la Clue, left Toulon with twelve ships-of-the-line on
the 5th of August, and on the 17th found himself at the Straits of
Gibraltar, with a brisk east wind carrying him out into the Atlantic.
Everything seemed propitious, a thick haze and falling night
concealing the French ships from the land, while not preventing their
sight of each other, when an English frigate loomed up in the near
distance. As soon as she saw the fleet, knowing they must be enemies,
she hauled in for the land and began firing signal-guns. Pursuit was
useless; flight alone remained. Hoping to elude the chase he knew must
follow, the French commodore steered west-northwest for the open sea,
putting out all lights; but either from carelessness or
disaffection,--for the latter is hinted by one French naval
officer,--five out of the twelve ships headed to the northward and put
into Cadiz when on the following morning they could not see the
commodore. The latter was dismayed when at daylight he saw his forces
thus diminished. At eight o'clock some sails made their appearance,
and for a few minutes he hoped they were the missing ships. Instead
of that, they were the lookouts of Boscawen's fleet, which, numbering
fourteen ships-of-the-line, was in full pursuit. The French formed
their order on one of the close-hauled lines, and fled; but of course
their fleet-speed was less than that of the fastest English ships. The
general rule for all chases where the pursuer is decidedly superior,
namely, that order must be observed only so far as to keep the leading
ships within reasonable supporting distance of the slower ones, so
that they may not be singly overpowered before the latter can come up,
was by this time well understood in the English navy, and that is
certainly the fitting time for a _melee_. Boscawen acted accordingly.
The rear ship of the French, on the other hand, nobly emulated the
example of L'Etenduere when he saved his convoy. Overtaken at two
o'clock by the leading English ship, and soon after surrounded by four
others, her captain made for five hours a desperate resistance, from
which he could hope, not to save himself, but to delay the enemies
long enough for the better sailers to escape. He so far succeeded
that--thanks to the injury done by him and their