better speed--they
did that day escape action at close quarters, which could only have
ended in their capture. When he hauled down his flag, his three
topmasts were gone, the mizzen-mast fell immediately after, and the
hull was so full of water that the ship was with difficulty kept
afloat. M. de Sabran--his name is worthy to be remembered--had
received eleven wounds in this gallant resistance, by which he
illustrated so signally the duty and service of a rearguard in
retarding pursuit. That night two of the French ships hauled off to
the westward, and so escaped. The other four continued their flight as
before; but the next morning the commodore, despairing of escape,
headed for the Portuguese coast, and ran them all ashore between Lagos
and Cape St. Vincent. The English admiral followed and attacked them,
taking two and burning the others, without regard to the neutrality of
Portugal. For this insult no amend was made beyond a formal apology;
Portugal was too dependent upon England to be seriously considered.
Pitt, writing to the English minister to Portugal about the affair,
told him that while soothing the susceptibilities of the Portuguese
government he must not allow it to suppose that either the ships would
be given up or the distinguished admiral censured.[99]

The destruction or dispersal of the Toulon fleet stopped the invasion
of England, though the five ships that got into Cadiz remained a
matter of anxiety to Sir Edward Hawke, who cruised before Brest.
Choiseul, balked of his main object, still clung to the invasion of
Scotland. The French fleet at Brest, under Marshal de Conflans, a sea
officer despite his title, numbered twenty sail-of-the-line, besides
frigates. The troops to be embarked are variously stated at fifteen to
twenty thousand. The original purpose was to escort the transports
with only five ships-of-the-line, besides smaller vessels. Conflans
insisted that the whole fleet ought to go. The minister of the navy
thought that the admiral was not a sufficiently skilful tactician to
be able to check the advance of an enemy, and so insure the safe
arrival of the convoy at its destination near the Clyde without
risking a decisive encounter. Believing therefore that there would be
a general action, he considered that it would be better to fight it
before the troops sailed; for if disastrous, the convoy would not be
sacrificed, and if decisively victorious, the road would then be
clear. The transports