equires the recollection of two sensations, each with one movement; the
distinction between sucking at the left breast and sucking at the right
is made after one trial. With this, the first act of the intellect is
performed, the first perception made, i. e., a sensation first localized
in time and space. The motor sensation of sucking has come, like the
sweet taste, _after_ a similar one, and it has come between two unlike
relations in space that were distinguished. By means of multiplied
perceptions (e. g., luminous fields not well defined, but yet defined)
and multiplied movements with sensations of touch, the perception, after
considerable time, acquires an object; i. e., the intellect, which
already allowed nothing bright to appear without boundary-lines, and
thus allowed nothing bright to appear except in space (whereas at the
beginning brightness, as was the case even later with sound, had no
limitation, no demarcation), begins to assign a cause for that which is
perceived. Hereby perception is raised to _representation_. The
often-felt, localized, sweet, warm, white wetness, which is associated
with sucking, now forms an idea, and one of the earliest ideas. When,
now, this idea has often arisen, the separate perceptions that have been
necessary to its formation are united more and more firmly. Then, when
one of these latter appears for itself, the memory-images of the others
will also appear, through co-excitement of the ganglionic cells
concerned; but this means simply that the _concept_ is now in existence.
For the concept has its origin in the union of attributes. Attributes
are perceived, and the memory-images of them, that is, accordingly,
memory-images of separate perceptions, are so firmly associated that,
where only one appears in the midst of entirely new impressions, the
concept yet emerges, because all the other images appear along with it.
Language is not required for this. Up to this point, those born deaf
behave exactly like infants that have all the senses, and like some
animals that form concepts.

These few first ideas, namely, the individual ideas, or sense-intuitions
that are generated by the first perceptions, and the simple general
ideas (of a lower order), or concepts, arising out of these--the
concepts of the child as yet without language, of microcephali also, of
deaf-mutes, and of the higher animals--have now this peculiarity, that
they have all been formed exactly in this way by the paren