ach
other, the two _egos_ are absolutely isolated from each other.
Newly-born children with no brain, who lived for hours and days, as I
myself saw in a case of rare interest, could suck, cry, move the limbs,
and feel (for they stopped crying and took to sucking when something
they could suck was put into their mouths when they were hungry). On the
other hand, if a human being could be born with a brain but without a
spinal marrow and could live, it would not be able to move its limbs.
When a normal babe, therefore, plays with its feet or bites itself in
the arm as it would bite a biscuit, we have in this a proof that the
brain with its perceptive apparatus is independent of the spinal marrow.
And the fact that acephalic new-born human beings and animal embryos
deprived of brain, as Soltmann and I found, move their limbs just as
sound ones do, cry just as they do, suck and respond to reflexes, proves
that the functions of the spinal marrow (inclusive of the optic thalami,
the corpora quadrigemina and the cervical marrow) are independent of the
cerebral hemispheres (together with the corpus striatum, according to
Soltmann).

Now, however, the brainless living child that sucks, cries, moves arms
and legs, and distinguishes pleasure from displeasure, has indisputably
an individuality, an _ego_. We must, then, of necessity admit two _egos_
in the child that has both cerebrum and spinal marrow, and that
represents to himself his arm as good to taste of, as something to like.
But, if two, why not several? At the beginning, when the centers of
sight, hearing, smell, and taste, in the brain are still imperfectly
developed, each of these perceives for itself, the perceptions in the
different departments of sense having as yet no connection at all with
one another. The case is like that of the spinal marrow, which at first
does not communicate, or only very imperfectly communicates, to the
brain that which it feels, e. g., the effect of the prick of a needle,
for the newly born do not generally react upon that. Only by means of
very frequent coincidences of unlike sense-impressions, in
tasting-and-touching, seeing-and-feeling, seeing-and-hearing,
seeing-and-smelling, tasting-and-smelling, hearing-and-touching, are the
intercentral connecting fibers developed, and then first can the various
representational centers, these "I"-makers, as it were, contribute, as
in the case of the ordinary formation of concepts, to the formation of