minister at
Genoa, and thence to proceed with his squadron to the Austrian
headquarters at Vado Bay. The seniority he had now attained made his
selection for this detached and responsible service less evidently
flattering than Hood's preferment of him to such positions when he was
junior in rank; but the duty had the distinction of being not only
arduous from the purely naval standpoint, but delicate in the
diplomatic management and tact required. Although Great Britain at
that period was rarely slack in resorting to strong and arbitrary
measures in dealing with neutrals, when her interests seemed to demand
it, she was always exceedingly desirous to avoid causes of needless
offence. The exigencies of Southern France, and of both the opposing
armies in the Riviera, had created a busy neutral trade, occupied in
supplying all parties to the war, as well as the inhabitants of
Genoese towns then in military occupation by the French. Although the
latter and the Austrians had both openly disregarded the neutrality of
Genoa, it was the policy of Great Britain now to manifest respect for
it as far as possible, and at the same time not to raise causes of
diplomatic contention over the neutral trade, although this was well
known to be supporting the enemy's army.

When Nelson left the fleet, he had, besides his special orders for his
own mission, a circular letter from the admiral to all vessels under
his command, framed upon instructions received from England a month
before, directing special care "not to give any just cause of offence
to the foreign powers in amity with his Majesty, and whenever any
ships or vessels belonging to the subjects of those powers shall be
detained, or brought by you into port, you are to transmit to the
Secretary of the Admiralty a complete specification of their cargoes,
and not to institute any legal process against such ships or vessels
until their lordships' further pleasure shall be known."

To the naval officers on the spot this order was calculated to
increase vastly the perplexities, which necessarily arose from the
occupation of the Genoese coast by French troops. But, besides
questions of trade, the weaker States, Genoa and Tuscany,--the latter
of which had recently made peace with France,--were driven to manifold
shifts and compromises, in order to maintain in their ports such
semblance of impartial neutrality as would save them from reprisals by
either party. These measures, while insur