with their ships' boats, but these were undecked, and of
limited capacity compared to those against which they were to act.
They were occasionally successful, but the results were too uncertain
and hazardous to warrant perseverance, although Bonaparte had to admit
that "The audacity of the English boats and the indolence of the
Genoese, who allow their own vessels to be taken in their own roads,
make it necessary to erect a battery for hot shot at a proper point,
which you will exact shall be done by the governor of San Remo."

Nelson's active mind, clinging with its usual accurate insight to the
decisive factor in the situation, now fixed upon the idea of seizing a
suitable point upon the Riviera to the westward of the French, upon
their line of communication with Nice. A body of troops there, strong
enough to hold the position, would stop the passage of supplies by
land, and, if they controlled an anchorage, a condition indispensable
to their support,--and to their retreat, if necessary to retire,--the
small vessels based upon that could better interrupt the coasting
business. In pursuance of this plan, he in the first week of September
made a cruise with the "Agamemnon" as far to the westward as Nice,
reconnoitring carefully all recesses of the shore line that seemed
available for the purpose. Upon his return, he wrote to De Vins what
he had done, and described San Remo as the only available spot. He
mentioned its disadvantages as well as its advantages, but undertook
positively to land there five thousand men with field-guns, and
provisions for a few days, to maintain their supplies by sea, and to
cover their embarkation in case retreat became imperative. In short,
he guaranteed to land such a force safely, and to be responsible for
its communications; for both which he practically pledged his
professional reputation. He added, what was indisputable, that the
French army must abandon its present lines for want of supplies, if
San Remo were held for some time.

De Vins replied on the 14th of September, expressing his interest in
the matter thus broached to him, but carefully evading the issue. He
addressed his remarks to the comparative merits of Vado and San Remo
as anchorages, upon which Nelson had touched barely, and only
incidentally, for the gist of his proposal was simply to intercept the
enemy's communications; if this were feasible, all other
considerations were subsidiary and matters of detail. San Remo wa