es had now arrived; from February to August
being the period that Bonaparte, who knew the wars of Italy
historically, considered the most proper for operations in the field,
because the least sickly. But for the backwardness of the spring,--for
snow that year lay upon the mountains late into March,--the campaign
doubtless would have been begun before. At the same time came fresh
reports, probably set afloat by the French, of large reinforcements of
seamen for the fleet and transports, in Toulon and Marseilles; and
Nelson furthermore received precise information that the enemy's
movement would be in three columns,--one upon Ceva, which was
Bonaparte's original scheme, one by the Bocchetta, and the third
either to march through Genoese territory to Spezia, or to be carried
thither by sea. Nelson felt no doubt that the last was the real plan,
aiming at the occupation of Leghorn and entrance into the plains of
Italy. The others he considered to be feints. There will in this
opinion be recognized the persistency of his old ideas. In fact, he a
month later revived his proposal of the previous year, to occupy San
Remo,--this time with British troops.

The urgency of the British, aided, perhaps, by the reports of the
French designs, prevailed at last upon Beaulieu to advance as
requested; nor can it be denied that the taking of Vado was in itself
a most proper and desirable accessory object of the campaign.
Unfortunately, the Austrian general, as is well known, fastening his
eyes too exclusively upon the ulterior object of his movement,
neglected to provide for the immediate close combination and mutual
support of the organized forces,--his own and the Piedmontese,--upon
which final success would turn. Manoeuvring chiefly by his own left,
towards the Riviera, and drawing in that direction the efforts of the
centre and right, he weakened the allied line at the point where the
Austrian right touched the Sardinian left. Through this thin curtain
Bonaparte broke, dividing the one from the other, and, after a series
of combats which extended over several days, rendering final that
division, both political and military, for the remainder of the war.

To one who has accustomed himself to see in Nelson the exponent of the
chief obstacle Napoleon had to meet,--who has recognized in the Nile,
in Copenhagen, and in Trafalgar, the most significant and
characteristic incident attending the failure of each of three great
and widely separat