this fleet is capable of performing; anything, and
everything. Much as I shall rejoice to see England, I lament our
present orders in sackcloth and ashes, so dishonourable to the dignity
of England." To the British minister at Naples his words were even
stronger: "Till this time it has been usual for the allies of England
to fall from her, but till now she never was known to desert her
friends whilst she had the power of supporting them. I yet hope the
Cabinet may, on more information, change their opinion; it is not all
we gain elsewhere which can compensate for our loss of honour. The
whole face of affairs is totally different to what it was when the
Cabinet formed their opinion."

Nevertheless, although Nelson's perceptions and reasoning were
accurate as far as they went, they erred in leaving out of the
calculation a most important consideration,--the maintenance of the
communications with England, which had assumed vital importance since
the general defection of the Italian States, caused by Bonaparte's
successes and his imperious demands. It would be more true to say that
he underestimated this factor than that he overlooked it; for he had
himself observed, six weeks earlier, when the approach of a Spanish
war first became certain: "I really think they would do us more damage
by getting off Cape Finisterre;[40] it is there I fear them," and the
reason for that fear is shown by his reproach against Man, already
quoted, for his neglect of the convoy. The position of the Spanish
Navy in its home ports was in fact intermediate--interior--as
regarded the British fleet and the source of its most essential
supplies. So long as its future direction remained uncertain, it lay
upon the flank of the principal British line of communications. Nelson
did not use, perhaps did not know, the now familiar terms of the
military art; and, with all his insight and comprehensive sagacity, he
suffered from the want of proper tools with which to transmute his
acute intuitions into precise thought, as well as of clearly
enunciated principles, which serve to guide a man's conclusions, and
would assuredly have qualified his in the present instance. Upon the
supposition that the Spanish Navy, practically in its entirety,
entered the Mediterranean and appeared off Corsica,--as it
did,--Nelson's reasoning was correct, and his chagrin at a retreat
justified; but, as he himself had wisely remarked to Beaulieu, it is
not safe to count upon your