f discouragement; but, upon the whole, the latter prevails. There is
no longer the feeling of neglect by his superior, of opportunity
slipping away through the inadequate force which timid counsels and
apathetic indolence allowed him. He sees that the chance which was
permitted to pass unimproved has now gone forever. "As the French
cannot want supplies to be brought into the Gulf of Genoa, for their
grand army," he writes to the admiral, "I am still of opinion that if
our frigates are wanted for other services, they may very well be
spared from the Gulf." And again, "As the service for which my
distinguishing pendant was intended to be useful, is nearly if not
quite at an end, I assure you I shall have no regret in striking it."
Sir John Jervis, he asserts with pride, has cruised with the fleet in
the Gulf of Genoa, close to shore, "where I will venture to say no
fleet ever cruised before--no officer can be more zealous or able to
render any service in our profession to England;" yet from the decks
of the flagship he and Nelson had helplessly watched a convoy passing
close in shore, and directly to windward, but wholly out of reach of
their powers of offence. At times, indeed, somewhat can be
accomplished. For several days the "Agamemnon" "has kept close to
shore, and harassed the enemy's troops very much. Field pieces are
drawn out on our standing in shore. You must defend me if any Genoese
towns are knocked down by firing at enemy's batteries. I will not fire
first." Six weeks later he writes again: "Our conduct has so
completely alarmed the French that all their coasting trade is at an
end; even the corvette, gunboats, &c., which were moored under the
fortress of Vado, have not thought themselves in security, but are all
gone into Savona Mole, and unbent their sails."

This movement, however, which he notes under the date of June 23,
proceeded probably less from fear than from the growing indifference
of the French concerning their communications by water, now that their
occupation of the line of the Adige River had solidified their
control over the ample resources of Piedmont and Lombardy. At the very
hour when Nelson was thus writing, he learned also the critical
condition of Leghorn through the approach of a French division, the
mere sending of which showed Bonaparte's sense of his present security
of tenure.

Nelson had severed by this time his long and affectionate connection
with the battered "Agamemnon." On