land in 1805,--so far, that is, as the purely
naval part of the latter project is concerned. He imagines as
perfectly feasible ("I firmly believe," are his words) a combination
at Toulon, of the fleet already there with divisions arriving from
Cadiz and Brest, giving a total much superior to that actually with
Jervis. This anticipates Napoleon's projected concentration under
Villeneuve in the Channel. Nelson then continues: "One week's very
superior fleet will effect a landing between Port Especia and Leghorn,
I mean on that coast of Italy.... We may fight their fleet, but unless
we can destroy them [i.e. the transports], their transports will push
on and effect their landing. What will the French care for the loss of
a few men-of-war? It is nothing if they can get into Italy." "Make us
masters of the channel for three days, and we are masters of the
world," wrote Napoleon to his admirals, with preparations far more
complete than those Nelson was considering in 1796, and the distance
across the Channel is less than from Vado to Spezia.[35]

With these convictions, Nelson immediately began to urge the necessity
of again occupying Vado upon the Austrian commander-in-chief, through
the medium of the British ministers to Genoa and Turin, with whom he
was in frequent correspondence. If this were not done, he assured
them, the enemy's fleet could with ease convoy a body of troops in
transports to Italy, which they could not do with their present force
unless they held Vado. It was also the only means, he added, by which
the French could be prevented from receiving plenty of provisions from
Genoa. "Unless the Austrians get possession of a point of land, we
cannot stop the coasting-trade." The latter argument, at any rate, was
incontestable; and it was also true that only by an advance to Vado
could communication between the army and the British fleet be
restored and maintained. Beaulieu, who had lately acquired a high
reputation on the battle-fields of Belgium, had now succeeded De Vins
in the command. He was averse to opening the campaign by an advance to
the sea, a feeling shared by the Austrians generally. He wished rather
to await the enemy in the plains of Lombardy, and to follow up by a
decisive blow the victory which he confidently expected there. It was
in this connection that Nelson warned him, that he must not reckon
upon the French following the line of action which he himself would
prefer.

The time for hostiliti