be defeated, or
must inevitably retreat into Piedmont, and abandon their artillery and
stores." These words, the substance of which he frequently repeats,
though written immediately before the disastrous Battle of Loano, do
not apply to the purpose entertained by the French on that occasion,
of endeavoring, by a small detachment at Voltri, to check the Austrian
retreat till their pursuers came up. He is contemplating a much more
considerable and sustained effort, strategic in character, and
identical in aim with his own proposal to De Vins about San Remo. It
is clear that Nelson, in his day, did not attach absolute deterrent
effect to a fleet in being, even to such an one as the British then
had in the Mediterranean. Important a factor as it was, it might
conceivably be disregarded, by a leader who recognized that the end in
view justified the risk.

There was yet another motive actuating Nelson in his present
proposals. Justly impatient of the delays and colorless policy of both
De Vins and the British leaders, he foresaw that the latter would be
made to take the blame, if the campaign proved abortive or disastrous.
The Austrians had at least something to show. They had advanced, and
they had seized Vado Bay, cutting off the intercourse between Genoa
and France, which Bonaparte deemed so important, and at the same time
securing an anchorage for the fleet. The latter had done nothing,
although its co-operation had been promised; except Nelson's little
squadron, in which was but one small ship-of-the-line out of the
twenty-three under Hotham's command, it had not been seen.[33] Nelson
was determined, as far as in him lay, to remove all grounds for
reproach. He urged the admiral to send him more ships, and abounded in
willingness towards De Vins. For the latter he had at first felt the
esteem and confidence which he almost invariably showed, even to the
point of weakness, towards those associated with him; but he now
became distrustful, and devoted himself to stopping every loophole of
excuse which might afterwards be converted into reproaches to the
navy.

The cause for the inadequacy of the force left under his command, of
which he often complains, is not apparent. The question was put direct
to the admiral whether he would co-operate with the fleet in the
proposed descent of the Austrians. He said that he could not, owing to
the nature of his instructions from home; but that he would answer
for it that the French na