of a strongly
fortified city with an army corps, and the mere seizure of a
comparatively open position by a detachment, which, if it means to
remain, must have time to fortify itself, in order to withstand the
overwhelming numbers that the enemy must at once throw upon it. The
time element, too, is of the utmost importance. It is one thing to
grasp a strong position with a few men, expecting to hold it for some
hours, to delay an advance or a retreat until other forces can come
into play, and quite another to attempt to remain permanently and
unsupported in such a situation. In the case before us, De Vins would
have landed five thousand men in a comparatively exposed position;
for, although the town of San Remo was in possession of the French,
who might be driven out for the moment, the only strong point, the
citadel, was occupied--as in the case of Savona, to the eastward of
the Austrians--by the Genoese, who would doubtless have refused
admission. Before his main body would still lie the works which the
French had been diligently strengthening for more than two months, and
which, with his whole force in hand, he did not care to assail. The
enemy, knowing him thus weakened, could well afford to spare a number
greatly superior to the detachment he had adventured, certain that,
while they were dislodging it, he could make no serious impression
upon their lines. As for retreat and embarkation under cover of the
guns of a squadron, when pressed by an enemy, the operation is too
critical to be hazarded for less than the greatest ends, and with at
least a fair possibility of success for the undertaking whose failure
would entail it.

Nelson's confidence in himself and in his profession, and his accurate
instinct that war cannot be made without running risks, combined with
his lack of experience in the difficulties of land operations to
mislead his judgment in the particular instance. In a converse sense,
there may be applied to him the remark of the French naval critic,
that Napoleon lacked "le sentiment exact des difficultes de la
marine." It was not only to British seamen, and to the assured control
of the sea, that Nelson thought such an attempt offered reasonable
prospect of success. He feared a like thing might be effected by the
French,--by evasion. "If the enemy's squadron comes on this coast, and
lands from three to four thousand men between Genoa and Savona, I am
confident that either the whole Austrian army will