s
admitted to be the poorer anchorage, unfit for the fleet, but open to
small vessels, which could carry the supplies to the Austrian
detachment, and stop those of the enemy. The move proposed was
intended to effect by sea, substantially, the object which De Vins
himself had told Nelson, three weeks before, that he was trying to
secure through the co-operation of the Sardinian land forces. "He has
been long expecting," wrote Nelson on the 13th of August, "an attack
by General Colli with the Piedmontese near Ormea, directly back from
Vintimiglia. This is the great point to be carried, as the Piedmontese
army would then get Vintimiglia, and ... probably, unless the enemy
are very active, their retreat to Nice will be cut off. De Vins says
he has flattered and abused the Piedmontese and Neapolitans, but
nothing will induce them to act." Colli was a good soldier, but his
relations with the Austrian were very strained, and coalitions rarely
act cordially. This plan, however, becoming known to the French, was
commended by Bonaparte as well conceived. "We have examined
attentively the project attributed to the enemy in the enclosed note.
We have found it conformable to his real interests, and to the present
distribution of his troops. The heights of Briga are in truth the key
to the Department of the Maritime Alps, since from there the high-road
may be intercepted and we be obliged to evacuate Tende. We charge you
to pay serious attention to this matter."[32] Disappointed in
Sardinian support, Nelson and De Vins had then discussed a plan, of
which the former's present proposal was the very clear and practical
outcome. Some risk must be run, he said; but De Vins, when it came to
the point, saw the dangers too plainly. He did not distinctly refuse,
but talked only, and instead of San Remo proposed to land west of
Nice, between it and the Var. Nothing, however, was done, or even
attempted, and Hotham refused co-operation.

Having regard to the decisive effect exercised upon any strategic
position, or movement, by a valid threat against the
communications,--considering, for example, the vital influence which
the French occupation of Genoa in 1800 had upon the campaign which
terminated at Marengo,--it is impossible to speak otherwise than with
respect of this proposal of Nelson's. Nevertheless, serious reflection
can scarcely fail to affirm that it was not really practicable. There
is an immeasurable difference between the holding