rance revived,
in Nelson the apprehension, so consonant to his military ideas at this
time, of an attempt upon the coast road in rear of the Austrians. He
even feared for Genoa itself, and for the "Agamemnon," while she lay
there, as the result of such a dash. The recurrence of this
prepossession is illustrative of his view of possibilities. The true
and primary object of the French was to consolidate their
communications; nor, with Bonaparte in the influential position he
then occupied, was any such ex-centric movement likely. For useful
purposes, Genoa was already at his disposal; the French subsistence
department was, by his plans, to collect there rations of corn for
sixty thousand men for three months, preparatory to an advance. For
the same object the coasting activity redoubled along the Riviera,
from Toulon to the French front. By November 1st a hundred
sail--transports and small ships of war--had assembled fifteen miles
behind Borghetto, in Alassio Bay, whither Nelson had chased them.
Depots and supplies were collecting there for the prospective
movement. Nelson offered to enter the bay with three
ships-of-the-line, specified by name, and to destroy them; but this
was declined by Sir Hyde Parker, who had temporarily succeeded Hotham
in command, and who at a later day, in the Baltic, was to check some
of Nelson's finest inspirations. "I pretend not to say," wrote the
latter, a month afterwards, when the Austrians had been driven from
their lines, "that the Austrians would not have been beat had not the
gunboats harassed them, for, on my conscience, I believe they would;
but I believe the French would not have attacked had we destroyed all
the vessels of war, transports, etc." As to the practicability of
destroying them, Nelson's judgment can safely be accepted, subject
only to the chances which are inseparable from war.

So far from reinforcing the squadron on the Riviera, Sir Hyde Parker
first reduced it, and then took away the frigates at this critical
moment, when the indications of the French moving were becoming
apparent in an increase of boldness. Their gunboats, no longer
confining themselves to the convoy of coasters, crept forward at times
to molest the Austrians, where they rested on the sea. Nelson had no
similar force to oppose to them, except the Neapolitans, whom he
ordered to act, but with what result is not clear. At the same time
the French partisans in Genoa became very threatening. On the 10t