etached command.

Immediately upon his arrival in Genoa, on July 17, the effect of the
neutral trade, if unchecked, upon the operations of both armies, was
brought before him by the British minister. Unless the supplies thus
received by the French could be stopped, the Austrian general would
not only be unable to advance, but feared he could not hold his
present position. If, on the other hand, the forage and grain thus
brought to them could be intercepted, they would be forced to retreat,
and there were hopes that the Austrians might reach Nice before
winter, thus covering the excellent and advanced harbor of
Villefranche as an anchorage for their British allies. Nelson readily
understood the situation, and admitted the necessity of the service
demanded of his squadron, which was simply a blow at the enemy's
communications; but he pointed out to the minister that the circular
instructions, before quoted, tied his hands. Not only would the
ordinary difficulties of proving the ownership and destination of a
cargo give rise to the usual vexatious disputes, and irritate
neutrals, contrary to the spirit of the order; but there was a
particular complication in this instance, arising from the occupation
of Genoese towns by French troops, and from the close proximity of the
neutral and hostile seaboards. These embarrassments might be met, were
it permissible to sell the cargoes, and hold the money value, subject
to the decision of an admiralty court upon the propriety of the
seizure; but this the circular explicitly forbade, until the case was
referred to England. If the decision there was adverse to the captors,
the other party would look to the responsible naval officer for
pecuniary redress, and as, during the delay, the cargo would be
spoiled, costs could come only out of the captor's pocket. Nelson's
experiences in the West Indies, ten years before, naturally made him
cautious about further legal annoyances.

All this he stated with his usual lucidity; but the case was one in
which his course could have been safely predicted by a person familiar
with his character. The need for the proposed action was evident. "The
whole of the necessity of stopping all the vessels is comprised in a
very few words: that, if we will not stop supplies of corn, etc.,
going to France, the armies will return from whence they came, and the
failure of this campaign, from which so much is expected, will be laid
to our want of energy; for the on