mont, lay the Sardinian forces, extending perpendicularly to the
main front of the French operations, and, so far as position went,
threatening their communications by the narrow land road. The
character of the ground intervening between the French and Austrians
rendered an attack upon either line, once fairly established, very
difficult; and it was doubtless a fault in the Austrian commander, De
Vins, while superior in force, to allow the enemy to strengthen
himself in a position which at the first had its weak points; the more
so as the plainly approaching peace between Spain and France foretold
that the Army of Italy would soon be reinforced. Having, however, made
this mistake, the Austrian settled himself in his works, shrugged the
responsibility off his own shoulders, and awaited that either the
Sardinians by land, or the British by sea, should, by choking the
communications of the French, compel them to abandon their lines.
Such was the situation when Nelson, on the 21st of July, had his first
interview with De Vins; on the 22d peace between Spain and France was
formally concluded. Within a month, Bonaparte, who then occupied a
prominent position in Paris, as military adviser to the Government,
was writing: "Peace with Spain makes offensive war in Piedmont
certain; my plan is being discussed; Vado will soon be taken;" and a
few days later, on the 25th of August, "Troops from Spain are marching
to Italy." It was incumbent upon the French to repossess Vado, for, by
affording safe anchorage to small hostile cruisers, it effectually
stopped the trade with Genoa. De Vins had there equipped several
privateers, under the Austrian flag. Of it Bonaparte said: "By
intercepting the coasters from Italy, it has suspended our commerce,
stopped the arrival of provisions, and obliged us to supply Toulon
from the interior of the Republic. It is recognized that our commerce
and subsistence require that communication with Genoa be promptly
opened." Having in view Bonaparte's remarkable campaign of the
following year, and the fact that Vado was now held in force by the
Austrians, the importance of British co-operation by the fleet, at
this critical moment, becomes strikingly apparent. The future thus
throws back a ray of illuminating significance upon the otherwise
paltry and obscure campaign of 1795, dragging out into broad daylight
the full meaning of lost opportunities in the early year, and of
Nelson's strenuous efforts in his d
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