en due to the
natural unwillingness of an invalid to quit his well-ordered
surroundings, by which even St. Vincent was led to take a first-rate
ship away with himself at a critical moment; but, if so, it only
emphasizes the absolute necessity of physical vigor to a
commander-in-chief.

Nelson had again managed to keep the "Agamemnon" well to the front,
for the other ships that succeeded in getting into action were almost
wholly from among those which had recently arrived from England with
Rear-Admiral Man. These, being fresh from home, should naturally
outsail a ship now two and a half years in commission, and which, not
long after, had to be wrapped with hawsers to hold her together. In
his comments on the action he says comparatively little of the signal
of recall, which, though ill-timed, he does not seem to have thought
affected the result materially; but he was utterly dissatisfied with
the previous management of the business, and into the causes of this
dissatisfaction it is desirable to look, as bearing at once upon his
natural military characteristics, and the development they received
from time and thought. "The scrambling distant fire was a farce," he
wrote; "but if one fell by such a fire, what might not have been
expected had our whole fleet engaged? Improperly as the part of the
fleet which fired got into action, we took one ship; but the subject
is unpleasant, and I shall have done with it." The criticism, though
far from explicit, evidently bears upon the manner in which the fleet
was handled, from the moment the enemy was sighted until the firing
began. During the latter, Man was the senior officer on the spot, and
Nelson does not blame him; on the contrary, punning on the name, says,
"He is a good _man_ in every sense of the word."

The precise working of his thought can only be inferred. "The whole
fleet" failed to get into action. Why? Because the signal for a
general chase was delayed from 4 to 8 A.M., pending certain
drill-ground manoeuvres, upon whose results, however well intended, no
dependence could be placed in Mediterranean weather. During these four
hours the wind was fresh,--the heel of a short summer's gale,
invaluable to both sides,--and the enemy were using it to close the
shore, where wind, the sole dependence for motive power, baffles most.
Had the fastest British ships, under a competent flag-officer,
utilized that time and that wind, there was, to put the case most
mildly, the chan