when two of the British lookout ships
reported that they had been seen a few hours before to the southwest,
south of the Hyeres Islands. The fleet made sail in that direction.
During the night a heavy gale came on from west-northwest, out of the
Gulf of Lyons, which split the main-topsails of several British ships.
At daybreak the enemy were discovered in the southeast, standing
north to close the land. After some elaborate manoeuvring--to reach
one of those formal orders, often most useful, but which the irregular
Mediterranean winds are prone to disarrange as soon as completed--the
admiral at 8 A.M. signalled a general chase. The British being to
windward, and the breeze fresh, the half-dozen leading ships had at
noon closed the enemy's rear within three-quarters of a mile; but,
from their relative positions, as then steering, the guns of neither
could be used effectively. At this time a shift of wind to north
headed off both fleets, which put their bows to the eastward, throwing
the British advanced vessels, to use Nelson's expression, into line
abreast, and bringing to bear the broadsides of the ships, of both
fleets, that were within range. The action then began, the British
fire being directed mainly upon the French rear ship, the "Alcide,"
which surrendered at about 2 P.M., and soon afterwards blew up. The
wind had meanwhile changed again to the eastward, giving the
weather-gage to the French, most of whom were considerably nearer the
shore than their opponents, and better sailers.

Up to this time Nelson, who in the forenoon had thought there was
every prospect of taking every ship in the French fleet, still felt
almost certain that six would be secured; but, to use his own words,
it was now "impossible to close." In the space between the ships
engaged, and to leeward, the light air seems to have been killed by
the cannonading; whereas the French, who were now to windward, still
received enough to draw slowly away. Hotham, being in one of the very
worst sailers in the fleet, if not in the Navy, had fallen eight miles
astern, and not seeing clearly how things were going, made at this
time a signal of recall, which was certainly premature. It seems a not
improper comment that, in light and baffling weather, such as that of
the Mediterranean, the commander-in-chief should have been in a fast
and handy ship, able at the least to keep him within eyeshot of the
decisive scene. Remaining in the "Britannia" may have be