rth and Cienfuegos on the south,--would be
invaluable to the mother country as an intermediate naval station and
as a base of supplies and reinforcements for both her fleet and army;
that, if left in her undisturbed possession, it would enable her,
practically, to enjoy the same advantage of nearness to the great
scene of operations that the United States had in virtue of our
geographical situation; and that, therefore, the first objective of
the war should be the eastern island, and its reduction the first
object. The effect of this would have been to throw Spain back upon
her home territory for the support of any operations in Cuba, thus
entailing upon her an extremely long line of communications, exposed
everywhere throughout its course, but especially to the molestation of
small cruisers issuing from the harbors of Puerto Rico, which flank
the routes, and which, upon the supposition, would have passed into
our hands. This view of the matter was urged upon the writer, a few
days before hostilities began, by a very old and intelligent naval
officer who had served in our own navy and in that of the Confederate
States. To a European nation the argument must have been quite
decisive; for to it, as distant, or more distant than Spain from Cuba,
such an intermediate station would have been an almost insurmountable
obstacle while in an enemy's hands, and an equally valuable base if
wrested from him. To the United States these considerations were
applicable only in part; for, while the inconvenience to Spain would
be the same, the gain to us would be but little, as our lines of
communication to Cuba neither required the support of Puerto Rico, nor
were by it particularly endangered.

This estimate of the military importance of Puerto Rico should never
be lost sight of by us as long as we have any responsibility, direct
or indirect, for the safety or independence of Cuba. Puerto Rico,
considered militarily, is to Cuba, to the future Isthmian canal, and
to our Pacific coast, what Malta is, or may be, to Egypt and the
beyond; and there is for us the like necessity to hold and strengthen
the one, in its entirety and in its immediate surroundings, that there
is for Great Britain to hold the other for the security of her
position in Egypt, for her use of the Suez Canal, and for the control
of the route to India. It would be extremely difficult for a European
state to sustain operations in the eastern Mediterranean with a
British