st mentioned. The squadron started back
immediately to the westward. During the night of this same day,
Thursday, May 12th, towards midnight, reliable information was
received at the Navy Department that Cervera's squadron had arrived
off Martinique,--four armored cruisers and three torpedo destroyers,
one of the latter entering the principal port of the island.
The movements of the Spanish division immediately preceding its
appearance off Martinique can be recovered in the main from the log of
the _Cristobal Colon_, which was found on board that ship by the
United States officers upon taking possession after her surrender on
July 3. Some uncertainty attends the conclusions reached from its
examination, because the record is brief and not always precise in its
statements; but, whatever inaccuracy of detail there may be, the
general result is clear enough.
At noon on May 10th the division was one hundred and thirty miles east
of the longitude of Martinique, and fifteen miles south of its
southernmost point. Being thus within twelve hours' run of the island,
Admiral Cervera evidently, and reasonably, considered that he might
now be in the neighborhood of danger, if the United States Government
had decided to attempt to intercept him with an armored division,
instead of sticking to the dispositions known to him when he
sailed,--the blockade of Cuba and the holding the Flying Squadron in
reserve. In order not to fall in with an enemy unexpectedly,
especially during the night, the speed of the division was reduced to
something less than four knots, and the torpedo destroyer _Terror_ was
sent ahead to reconnoitre and report. The incident of her separating
from her consorts is not noted,--a singular omission, due possibly to
its occurring at night and so escaping observation by the _Colon_; but
it is duly logged that she was sighted "to port" next morning, May
11th, at 9 A.M., and that, until she was recognized, the crew were
sent to their quarters for action. This precaution had also been
observed during the previous night, the men sleeping beside their
guns,--a sufficient evidence of the suspicions entertained by the
Spanish Admiral.
At 10 A.M.--by which hour, or very soon afterwards, the communication
of the _Terror_ with the Admiral recorded by the log must have taken
place--there had been abundance of time since daybreak for a 15-knot
torpedo destroyer, low-lying in the water, to remain unseen within
easy scouting
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