e an accepted apothegm, with those responsible for
the conduct of military operations, that "War is business," to which
actual fighting is incidental. As in all businesses, the true aim is
the best results at the least cost; or, as the great French admiral,
Tourville, said two centuries ago, "The best victories are those which
expend least of blood, of hemp, and of iron." Such results, it is
true, are more often granted to intelligent daring than to excessive
caution; but no general rule can supersede the individual judgment
upon the conditions before it. There are no specifics in warfare.

To this main reason, others less immediately important concurred. The
ships would be taken out of a trying climate, and removed from the
chance of hurricanes; while the crews would receive a benefit, the
value of which is avouched by naval history, in change of scene, of
occupation, and of interests. The possibility of the enemy attempting
to divert us from our aim, by sending vessels to the West Indies, was
considered, and, although regarded as wildly improbable, provision
against it was made. As Nelson wrote to his commander-in-chief before
the advance on Copenhagen: "There are those who think, if you leave
the Sound open, that the Danish fleet may sail from Copenhagen to join
the Dutch or French. I own I have no fears on that subject; for it is
not likely that whilst their capital is menaced with an attack, nine
thousand of her best men should be sent out of the kingdom." It was
still less probable that Spain in the present case would attempt any
diversion to the West Indies, and the movement of our heavy-armored
vessels to her shores could now justly be considered to cover all our
operations on this side of the Atlantic. The detailed arrangements
made for frequent communication, however, would have kept the
Department practically in touch with our fleet throughout, and have
enabled us to counteract any despairing effort of the enemy.

FOOTNOTES:

[4] The lighter upper masts, upon which speed much depended in moderate
weather.

THE PEACE CONFERENCE AND THE MORAL ASPECT OF WAR

THE PEACE CONFERENCE AND THE MORAL ASPECT OF WAR

To determine the consequences of an historical episode, such as the
recent Peace Conference at The Hague, is not a matter for prophecy,
but for experience, which alone can decide what positive issues, for
good or for ill, shall hereafter trace their source to this beginning.
The most that