ir proper usefulness, the immensely larger number of
projectiles fired in a given time, and valid against the target
presented to them, makes the rapid-fire battery a much stronger
weapon, offensively, than the slow-acting giants. Here is the great
defect of the monitor, properly so-called; that is, the low-freeboard
monitor. Defensively, the monitor is very strong; offensively, judged
by present-day standards, it is weak, possessing the heavy cannon, but
deficient in rapid fire. Consequently, its usefulness is limited
chiefly to work against fortifications,--a target exceptional in
resistance, and rarely a proper object for naval attack. It is the
opinion of the writer that no more monitors should be built, except as
accessory to the defence of those harbors where submarine mines cannot
be depended upon,--as at San Francisco and Puget Sound. It should be
added that the monitor at sea rolls twice as rapidly as the
battleship, which injuriously affects accuracy of aim; that is,
offensive power.
The general principle of the decisive superiority of offensive power
over defensive is applicable throughout,--to the operations of a war,
to the design of a battleship, to the scheme of building a whole navy.
It is to the erroneous belief in mere defence that we owe much of the
faith in the monitor, and some of the insistence upon armor; while the
cry that went up for local naval defence along our coast, when war
threatened in the spring of 1898, showed an ignorance of the first
principles of warfare, which, if not resisted, would have left us
impotent even before Spain.
Brief mention only can be given to the other classes of vessels needed
by the navy. Concerning them, one general remark must be made. They
are subsidiary to the fighting fleet, and represent rather that
subdivision of a whole navy which is opposed to the idea of
concentration, upon which the battleship rests. As already noted, a
built ship cannot be divided; therefore, battleships must be
supplemented by weaker or smaller vessels, to perform numerous
detached and often petty services.
From this characteristic of detachment--often singly--important
engagements will rarely be fought by these smaller vessels. Therefore,
in them fighting power declines in relative importance, and speed, to
perform their missions, increases in proportion. As their essential
use is not to remain at the centres, but to move about, they are
called generically cruisers, from the Fr
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