lf from the Brazilian Republic, as Texas
once detached itself from Mexico; and which may then seek political
union with Germany, as Texas sought political union with the United
States, to obtain support against her former owners and masters.
Without advancing any particular opinion as to the advisable
geographical limits of the Monroe doctrine, we may be pretty sure that
the American people would wordily resent an act which in our press
would be called "the aggression of a European military monarchy upon
the political or territorial rights of an American republic." This
also could be accompanied with the liberal denunciation of William II.
which now ornaments our editorial columns; but hard words break no
bones, and the practical question would remain, "What are you going to
do about it?" with a navy "for defence only." If you cannot offend
Germany, in the military sense of "offend"--that is, if you cannot
seek her out and _hurt_ her--how are you going to control her? In
contemplation of the future contingencies of our national policy, let
us contrast our own projected naval force with that now recommended to
the German Reichstag by the Budget Committee, despite the many
prophecies that the Emperor could not obtain his desired navy. "The
Budget Committee of the Reichstag to-day adopted, in accordance with
the government proposals, parts of the naval bill, fixing the number
of ships to be held in readiness for service as follows: 1 flagship,
18 battleships, 12 large cruisers, 30 small cruisers, 8 coast-defence
ironclads, and 13 gunboats, besides torpedo-boats, schoolships, and
small gunboats."[5] That these numbers were fixed with reference to
the United States is indeed improbable; but the United States should
take note.
A second means of expanding Germany as a colonial power would be to
induce the Dutch--who are the Germans of the lower Rhine and the North
Sea--to seek union with the German Empire, the empire of the Germans
of the upper Rhine, of the Elbe, and of the Baltic. This, it may be
said, would be far less difficult in consummation than the scheme last
suggested; for in Brazil, as in the United States and elsewhere, the
German emigrant tends to identify himself with the institutions he
finds around him, and shows little disposition to political
independence--a fact which emphasizes the necessity of strictly German
colonies, if the race, outside of Europe, is not to undergo political
absorption. The difficulti
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