f the United States during the hostilities; and that the judgment,
energy, and watchfulness with which it was fulfilled by Admiral
Sampson merits the highest praise. The lack of widely diffused popular
appreciation of military conditions, before referred to in these
papers, has been in nothing more manifest than in the failure to
recognize generally, and by suitable national reward, both the
difficulty of his task, and that the dispositions maintained by him
ensured the impossibility of Cervera's escaping undetected, as well as
the success of the action which followed his attempt at flight. This
made further fighting on Spain's part hopeless and vindicated, if
vindication were needed, the Department's choice of the
commander-in-chief; but, as a matter of fact, the reply of that great
admiral and experienced administrator, Lord St. Vincent, when he sent
Nelson to the Nile, meets decisively all such cases: "Those who are
responsible for results"--as the Navy Department (under the
President), was--"must be allowed the choice of their agents." The
writer may perhaps be excused for adding, that, having had no share,
direct or indirect, in this selection, which entirely preceded his
connection with the Department, he can have no motive of
self-justification regarding an appointment for which he could deserve
neither credit nor blame.

The office of the Navy Department at that moment, so far as Santiago
itself was concerned, was chiefly administrative: to maintain the
number of ships and their necessary supplies of coal, ammunition, and
healthy food at the highest point consistent with the requirements of
other parts of the field of war. During the month of June, being, as
it was, the really decisive period of the campaign, these demands for
increase of force naturally rose higher in every quarter. A numerous
convoy had to be provided for the army expedition; the battle fleet
had to be supplemented with several light cruisers; it became evident
that the sphere of the blockade must be extended, which meant many
more ships; and in the midst of all this, Camara started for Suez. All
this only instances the common saying, "It never rains but it pours."
Our battle fleet before Santiago was more than powerful enough to
crush the hostile squadron in a very short time, if the latter
attempted a stand-up fight. The fact was so evident that it was
perfectly clear nothing of the kind would be hazarded; but,
nevertheless, we could not af