Saturday, June 4th, Commodore Remey, commanding the naval base at
Key West, telegraphed that the naval vessels composing the convoy
would be ready to sail that evening. The army was embarked and ready
to move on the 8th, but early that morning was received the report,
alluded to in a previous paper, that an armored cruiser with three
vessels in company had been sighted by one of our blockading fleet
the evening before, in the Nicolas Channel, on the north coast of
Cuba. Upon being referred back, the statement was confirmed by the
officer making it, and also by another vessel which had passed over
the same ground at nearly the same time. The account being thus both
specific and positive, the sailing of the transports was
countermanded,--the naval vessels of the convoy being sent out from
Key West to scour the waters where the suspicious ships had been seen,
and Admiral Sampson directed to send his two fastest armored vessels
to Key West, in order that the expedition might proceed in force. The
Admiral, being satisfied that the report was a mistake, of a character
similar to others made to him at the same time, did not comply; a
decision which, under the circumstances of his fuller knowledge, must
be considered proper as well as fortunate. The incident was mortifying
at the time, and--considering by how little Escario arrived
late--might have been disastrous; but it is one of those in which it
is difficult to assign blame, though easy to draw a very obvious moral
for outlooks.

The expedition finally got away from Tampa on the 14th of June, and
arrived off Santiago on the 20th. The process of collecting and
preparing the convoy, the voyage itself, and the delay caused by the
false alarm, constituted together a period of three weeks, during
which the naval vessels of the expedition were taken away from the
blockade. Some days more were needed to coal them, and to get them
again to their stations. Meanwhile it was becoming evident that the
limits of the blockade must be extended, in order that full benefit
might be derived from it as a military measure. The southern ports of
Cuba west of Santiago, and especially the waters about the Isle of
Pines and Batabano, which is in close rail connection with Havana,
were receiving more numerous vessels, as was also the case with Sagua
la Grande, on the north. In short, the demand for necessaries was
producing an increasing supply, dependent upon Jamaica and Mexico in
the south, upon