of Santiago as suicidal folly, but because it was
felt that the burden of such a decision should be assumed by a
superior authority, less liable to suffer in personal reputation from
the idle imputations of over-caution, which at times were ignorantly
made by some who ought to have known better, but did not. "The matter
is left to your discretion," the telegram read, "except that the
United States armored vessels must not be risked."

When Cervera's squadron was once cornered, an intelligent opponent
would, under any state of naval preparedness, have seen the
advisability of forcing him out of the port by an attack in the rear,
which could be made only by an army. As Nelson said on one occasion,
"What is wanted now is not more ships, but troops." Under few
conditions should such a situation be prolonged. But the reasons
adduced in the last paragraph made it doubly incumbent upon us to
bring the matter speedily to an issue, and the combined expedition
from Tampa was at once ordered. Having in view the number of hostile
troops in the country surrounding Santiago, as shown by the subsequent
returns of prisoners, and shrewdly suspected by ourselves beforehand,
it was undoubtedly desirable to employ a larger force than was sent.
The criticism made upon the inadequate number of troops engaged in
this really daring movement is intrinsically sound, and would be
wholly accurate if directed, not against the enterprise itself, but
against the national shortsightedness which gave us so trivial an army
at the outbreak of the war. The really hazardous nature of the
movement is shown by the fact that the column of Escario, three
thousand strong, from Manzanillo, reached Santiago on July 3rd; too
late, it is true, abundantly too late, to take part in the defence of
San Juan and El Caney, upon holding which the city depended for food
and water; yet not so late but that it gives a shivering suggestion
how much more arduous would have been the task of our troops had
Escario come up in time. The incident but adds another to history's
long list of instances where desperate energy and economy of time have
wrested safety out of the jaws of imminent disaster. The occasion was
one that called upon us to take big risks; and success merely
justifies doubly an attempt which, from the obvious balance of
advantages and disadvantages, was antecedently justified by its
necessity, and would not have been fair subject for blame, even had it
failed.