got to Barbados at 3.20 A.M. of May 18th, less than
six days had elapsed since Cervera quitted Martinique; and the two
islands are barely one hundred miles apart. All this, of course, is
very much more clear to our present knowledge than it could possibly
be to the Spanish Admiral, who probably, and not unnaturally, thought
it far better to get his "fleet in being" under the guns of a friendly
port than to hazard it on what might prove a wild-goose chase; for,
after all, Captain Clark might not have gone to Barbados.
It may be interesting to the reader to say here that the Navy
Department,--which was as much in the dark as Cervera
himself,--although it was necessarily concerned about the _Oregon_, and
gave much thought to the problem how best to assure her safety, was
comforted by the certainty that, whatever befell the ship, the national
interests would not be gravely compromised if she did meet the enemy.
The situation was not novel or unprecedented, and historical precedents
are an immense support to the spirit in doubtful moments. Conscious of
the power of the ship herself, and confident in her captain and
officers, whom it knew well, the Department was assured, to use words
of Nelson when he was expecting to be similarly outnumbered, "Before we
are destroyed, I have little doubt but the enemy will have their wings
so completely clipped that they will be easily overtaken." Such odds
for our ship were certainly not desired; but, the best having been done
that could be in the circumstances, there was reasonable ground to
believe that, by the time the enemy got through with her, they would
not amount to much as a fighting squadron.
Some little while after the return of Admiral Sampson's squadron to
New York, the writer chanced to see, quoted as an after-dinner speech
by the chief engineer of the _Oregon_, the statement that Captain
Clark had communicated to his officers the tactics he meant to pursue,
if he fell in with the Spanish division. His purpose, as so explained,
deserves to be noted; for it assures our people, if they need any
further assurance, that in the single ship, as in the squadrons,
intelligent skill as well as courage presided in the councils of the
officers in charge. The probability was that the Spanish vessels,
though all reputed faster than the _Oregon_, had different rates of
speed, and each singly was inferior to her in fighting force, in
addition to which the American ship had a very heavy s
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