the opponent; but this best defence cannot be employed to the
utmost, if the inferior, passive defence of fortification has been
neglected. The fencer who wears also a breastplate may be looser in
his guard. Seaports cannot strike beyond the range of their guns; but
if the great commercial ports and naval stations can strike
effectively so far, the fleet can launch into the deep rejoicing,
knowing that its home interests, behind the buckler of the fixed
defences, are safe till it returns.
The broader determining conditions, and the consequent dispositions
made by the Government of the United States and its naval authorities,
in the recent campaign, have now been stated and discussed. In them
is particularly to be noted the crippling effect upon naval operations
produced by the consciousness of inadequate coast defences of the
permanent type. The sane conclusion to be drawn is, that while
sea-coast fortification can never take the place of fleets; that
while, as a defence even, it, being passive, is far inferior to the
active measure of offensive defence, which protects its own interests
by carrying offensive war out on to the sea, and, it may be, to the
enemy's shores; nevertheless, by the fearless freedom of movement it
permits to the navy, it is to the latter complementary,--completes it;
the two words being etymologically equivalent.
The other comments hitherto made upon our initial plan of
operations--for example, the impropriety of attempting simultaneous
movements against Puerto Rico and Cuba, and the advisability or
necessity, under the same conditions, of moving against both
Cienfuegos and Havana by the measure of a blockade--were simply
special applications of general principles of warfare, universally
true, to particular instances in this campaign. They address
themselves, it may be said, chiefly to the soldier or seaman, as
illustrating his especial business of directing war; and while their
value to the civilian cannot be denied,--for whatever really
enlightens public opinion in a country like ours facilitates military
operations,--nevertheless the function of coast defence, as
contributory to sea power, is a lesson most necessary to be absorbed
by laymen; for it, as well as the maintenance of the fleet, is in this
age the work of peace times, when the need of preparation for war is
too little heeded to be understood. The illustrations of the
embarrassment actually incurred from this deficiency in the la
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