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hostilities are of the nature of an object lesson, and as such should
be pondered.
At the same time, however, that attention is thus called to the
inevitable and far-reaching effect of such antecedent neglects, shown
in directions where men would not ordinarily have expected them, it is
necessary to check exaggeration of coast defence, in extent or in
degree, by remarking that in any true conception of war,
fortification, defence, inland and sea-coast alike, is of value merely
in so far as it conduces to offensive operations. This is
conspicuously illustrated by our recent experience. The great evil of
our deficiencies in coast armament was that they neutralized
temporarily a large part of our navy; prevented our sending it to
Cuba; made possible that Cervera's squadron, during quite an interval,
might do this or that thing of several things thus left open to him,
the result of which would have been to encourage the enemy, and
possibly to produce political action by our ill-wishers abroad.
Directly upon this consideration--of the use that the Flying Squadron
might have been, if not held up for coast defence--follows the further
reflection how much more useful still would have been a third
squadron; that is, a navy half as large again as we then had.
Expecting Cervera's force alone, a navy of such size, free from
anxiety about coast defence, could have barred to him San Juan de
Puerto Rico as well as Cienfuegos and Havana; or had Camara been
joined to Cervera, as he should have been, such a force would have
closed both Cienfuegos and Havana with divisions that need not have
feared the combined enemy. If, further, there had been a fourth
squadron--our coast defence in each case remaining the same--our
evident naval supremacy would probably have kept the Spanish fleet in
Europe. Not unlikely there would have been no war; in which event, the
anti-imperialist may observe there would, thanks to a great and
prepared navy, have been no question of the Philippines, and possibly
none of Hawaii.
In short, it is with coast defence and the navy as it is with numbers
_versus_ size in battleships. Both being necessary, the question of
proportion demands close attention, but in both cases the same single
principle dominates: offensive power, not defensive, determines the
issues of war. In the solution of the problem, the extent to be given
coast defence by fortification depends, as do all military decisions,
whether of prepara
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