wards us in particular, because we had of the same class but two
ships,--one-half its own force,--the _New York_ and the _Brooklyn_;
and, moreover, we had no torpedo cruisers to oppose to the three which
accompanied it. These small vessels, while undoubtedly an encumbrance
to a fleet in extended strategic movements in boisterous seas, because
they cannot always keep up, are a formidable adjunct--tactical in
character--in the day of battle, especially if the enemy has none of
them; and in the mild Caribbean it was possible that they might not
greatly delay their heavy consorts in passages which would usually be
short.
The two main divisions of the Spanish fleet were thus about fifteen
hundred miles apart when war began on the 25th of April. The
neutrality of Portugal made it impossible for Cervera to remain long
in his then anchorage, and an immediate decision was forced upon his
Government. It is incredible that among the advisers of the Minister
of Marine--himself a naval officer--there was no one to point out that
to send Cervera at once to the Antilles, no matter to what port, was
to make it possible for the United States to prevent any future
junction between himself and the remaining vessels of their navy. The
squadron of either Sampson or Schley was able to fight him on terms of
reasonable equality, to say the least. Either of our divisions,
therefore, was capable of blockading him, if caught in port; and it
was no more than just to us to infer that, when once thus cornered, we
should, as we actually did at Santiago, assemble both divisions, so as
to render escape most improbable and the junction of a reinforcement
practically impossible. Such, in fact, was the intention from the very
first: for, this done, all our other undertakings, Cuban blockade and
what not, would be carried on safely, under cover of our watching
fleet, were the latter distant ten miles or a thousand from such other
operations. The writer, personally, attaches but little importance to
the actual consequences of strictly offensive operations attempted by
a "fleet in being," when of so inferior force. As suggested by Spanish
and foreign officers, in various publications, they have appeared to
him fantastic pranks of the imagination, such as he himself indulged
in as a boy, rather than a sober judgment formed after considering
both sides of the case. "I cannot but admire Captain Owen's zeal,"
wrote Nelson on one occasion, "in his anxious desire
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