he British so many
possibilities of mischief that they were compelled to keep constantly
before each of the French ports a force superior to that within,
entailing an expense and an anxiety by which the Emperor hoped to
exhaust their endurance. To some extent this was Cervera's position
and function in Santiago, whence followed logically the advisability
of a land attack upon the port, to force to a decisive issue a
situation which was endurable only if incurable. "The destruction of
Cervera's squadron," justly commented an Italian writer, before the
result was known, "is the only really decisive fact that can result
from the expedition to Santiago, because it will reduce to impotence
the naval power of Spain. The determination of the conflict will
depend throughout upon the destruction of the Spanish sea power, and
not upon territorial descents, although the latter may aggravate the
situation." The American admiral from before Santiago, when urging the
expedition of a land force to make the bay untenable, telegraphed,
"The destruction of this squadron will end the war;" and it did.
In other respects it is probable that the Spanish admiral had little
confidence in a squadron which, whatever the courage or other
qualities of the officers and seamen, had never manoeuvred together
until it left the Cape de Verde Islands. Since its destruction, a
writer in a Spanish naval magazine has told the following incident:
"A little more than a year ago we visited General Cervera in La
Carraca, [the Cadiz arsenal], and we said to him: 'You appear to be
indicated, by professional opinion, for the command of the squadron in
case war is declared.' 'In that case,' he replied, 'I shall accept,
knowing, however, that I am going to a Trafalgar.' 'And how could that
disaster be avoided?' 'By allowing me to expend beforehand fifty
thousand tons of coal in evolutions and ten thousand projectiles in
target practice. Otherwise we shall go to a Trafalgar. Remember what I
say.'"
It is curious to contrast with this well-founded fear of an
experienced and gallant officer, expressed in private conversation,
the opinion of another Spanish officer, lately Minister of Marine,
reported to the Madrid public through a newspaper,--the "Heraldo," of
April 6, 1898. It illustrates, further, the curious illusions
entertained in high quarters in Spain:
"We had an opportunity to-day of talking for a long time with General
Beranger, the last Secretary of th
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