alian writer who
has treated the whole subject of this war with comprehensive and
instructive perspicacity--Spain had "the possibility of contesting the
command of the sea, and even of securing a definite preponderance, by
means of a squadron possessed of truly exceptional characteristics,
both tactical and strategic,"--in short, by means of a "fleet in
being."

It is true that in this estimate the writer quoted included the
_Carlos V._, a new and high-powered armored cruiser, and also a number
of protected cruisers and of torpedo vessels, of various kinds, all
possessing a rate of speed much superior to the more distinctly
fighting ships in which consisted the strength of the United States
squadrons. Such a fleet, homogeneous in respect to the particular
function which constitutes the power of a "fleet in being," whose
effectiveness lies in its legs and in its moral effect, in its power
to evade pursuit and to play upon the fears of an enemy, should be
capable of rapid continuous movement; and such a fleet Spain actually
possessed when the war broke out--only it was not ready. "This
splendid fleet," resumed our Italian critic, giving rein, perhaps, to
a Southern imagination, but not wholly without just reason, "would be
in a condition to impose upon the enemy the character which the
conflict should assume, alike in strategy and in tactics, and thereby
could draw the best and greatest advantage from the actual situation,
with a strong probability of partial results calculated to restore the
equilibrium between the two belligerent fleets, or even of successes
so decisive, if obtained immediately after the declaration of war, as
to include a possibility of a Spanish preponderance." The present
writer guards himself from being understood to accept fully this
extensive programme for a fleet distinctly inferior in actual
combative force; but the general assumption of the author quoted
indicates the direction of effort which alone held out a hope of
success, and which for that reason should have been vigorously
followed by the Spanish authorities.

As the Spanish Navy--whatever its defects in organization and
practice--is not lacking in thoughtful and instructed officers, it is
probable that the despatch of Cervera with only four ships, instead of
at least the five armored cruisers well qualified to act together,
which he might have had, not to speak of the important auxiliaries
also disposable, was due to uninstructed pop