ded to strangle the Spanish armies in Cuba
and the Philippines, and which, when fully developed, would entirely
sever their necessary communications with the outside world. Besides
all this, the concentration of our efforts upon Cuba, with a
subsequent slight extension to the single port of San Juan in Puerto
Rico, imposed upon Spain the burden of sustaining the war between
three and four thousand miles from home, and spared us the like
additional strain. Every consideration so far entertained, therefore,
of energy as well as of prudence, dictated the application of all the
pressure at our disposal at the beginning of hostilities, and until
the destruction of Cervera's squadron, upon Cuba, and in a very minor
degree upon Puerto Rico. Indeed, the ships placed before San Juan were
not for blockade, properly so called, but to check any mischievous
display of energy by the torpedo cruiser within.

After thus noting briefly the conditions of the enemy's coast defences
and commerce, there remains to consider the one other element of his
sea power--the combatant navy--with regard to its force and to its
disposition when war began.

As was before said, the disparity between the armored fleets of the
two nations was nominally inconsiderable; and the Spaniards possessed
one extremely valuable--and by us unrivalled--advantage in a nearly
homogeneous group of five[1] armored cruisers, very fast, and very
similar both in nautical qualities and in armament. It is difficult to
estimate too highly the possibilities open to such a body of ships,
regarded as a "fleet in being," to use an expression that many of our
readers may have seen, but perhaps scarcely fully understood.

The phrase "fleet in being," having within recent years gained much
currency in naval writing, demands--like the word "jingo"--preciseness
of definition; and this, in general acceptance, it has not yet
attained. It remains, therefore, somewhat vague, and so occasions
misunderstandings between men whose opinions perhaps do not materially
differ. The writer will not attempt to define, but a brief
explanation of the term and its origin may not be amiss. It was first
used, in 1690, by the British admiral Lord Torrington, when defending
his course in declining to engage decisively, with an inferior force,
a French fleet, then dominating in the Channel, and under cover of
which it was expected that a descent upon the English coast would be
made by a great French army.