t and branch, by our expeditions against her
colonies, Cuba and Manila; for her most important trade depended upon
monopoly of the colonial markets. The slight stream of traffic
maintained in Spanish bottoms between the English Channel and the
Peninsula, was so small that it could readily have been transferred to
neutral ships, whose flag we had for this war engaged should protect
enemy's goods. Under these circumstances, the coasts of the
Philippines and of Cuba were to us the coast of Spain, and far more
conveniently so than that of the home country would have been. A
Spanish merchant captain, writing from Barcelona as early as the 7th
of May, had said: "At this moment we have shut up in this port the
[steam] fleets of five transatlantic companies," which he names. "The
sailing-vessels are tied up permanently. Several [named] ships have
fallen into the hands of the enemy. Meantime the blockade of Cuba,
Puerto Rico, and Manila continues, at least for our flag, and maritime
commerce is at a standstill. In Barcelona some foreign firms,
exporters to the Philippines, have failed, as well as several
custom-house brokers, owing to the total cessation of mercantile
movement. The losses already suffered by our trade are incalculable,
amounting to much more than the millions needed to maintain a
half-dozen armored ships, which would have prevented the Yankees from
daring so much." These vessels continued to lie idle in Barcelona
until the dread of Commodore Watson's threatened approach caused them
to be sent to Marseilles, seeking the protection of the neutral port.
A few weeks later the same Spanish writer comments: "The result of our
mistakes," in the management of the navy, "is the loss of the markets
of Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines, and, in consequence, the
death of our merchant marine." Inquiries were addressed by the state
to the Chambers of Commerce, for suggestions as to the opening of new
markets, to compensate for the existing suspension of communications
with "the over-sea provinces."
With such results from our operations in the Antilles and the
Philippines, there was no inducement, and indeed no justification, for
sending cruisers across the ocean, until we had enough and to spare
for the blockade of Cuba and Puerto Rico. This was at no time the
case, up to the close of the war, owing to a combination of causes.
The work of paralyzing Spanish trade was being effectually done by
the same measures that ten
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