almost, of food and ammunition--were introduced; for Cuba, in
these respects, produces little.
To perfect such isolation, however, it was necessary not only to place
before each port armed cruisers able to stop merchant steamers, but
also to give to the vessels so stationed, as well on the south as on
the north side, a backbone of support by the presence of an armored
fleet, which should both close the great ports--Havana and
Cienfuegos--and afford a rallying-point to the smaller ships, if
driven in by the appearance of Cervera's division. The main
fleet--three armored ships--on the north was thus used, although the
blockade, from the fewness of available cruisers, was not at first
extended beyond Cardenas. On the south a similar body--the Flying
Squadron--should from the first have been stationed before
Cienfuegos; for each division, as has been said, could with military
propriety have been risked singly against Cervera's four ships. This
was not done, because it was possible--though most improbable--that
the Spanish squadron might attempt one of our own ports; because we
had not perfect confidence in the harbor defences; and because, also,
of the popular outcry. Consequently, the extremely important port of
Cienfuegos, a back door to Havana, was blockaded only by a few light
cruisers; and when the Spanish squadron was reported at Curacao, these
had to be withdrawn. One only was left to maintain in form the
blockade which had been declared; and she had instructions to clear
out quickly if the enemy appeared. Neither one, nor a dozen, of such
ships would have been the slightest impediment to Cervera's entering
Cienfuegos, raising our blockade by force; and this, it is needless to
add, would have been hailed in Spain and throughout the Continent of
Europe as a distinct defeat for us,--which, in truth, it would have
been, carrying with it consequences political as well as military.
This naval mishap, had it occurred, would have been due mainly to
inadequate armament of our coasts; for to retain the Flying Squadron
in the Chesapeake, merely as a guard to the coasting trade, would have
been a serious military error, subordinating an offensive
operation--off Cienfuegos--to one merely defensive, and not absolutely
vital. "The best protection against an enemy's fire," said Farragut,
"is a well-directed fire from our own guns." Analogically, the best
defence for one's own shores is to harass and threaten seriously those
of
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