s at stake as the result of a war, or even as the unnecessary
prolongation of war, with its sufferings and anxieties, the only safe
rule is to regard the apparent as the actual, until its reality has
been tested. However good their information, nations, like fencers,
must try their adversary's force before they take liberties.
Reconnaissance must precede decisive action. There was, on the part
of the Navy Department, no indisposition to take risks, provided
success, if obtained, would give an adequate gain. It was clearly
recognized that war cannot be made without running risks; but it was
also held, unwaveringly, that no merely possible success justified
risk, unless it gave a fair promise of diminishing the enemy's naval
force, and so of deciding the control of the sea, upon which the issue
of the war depended. This single idea, and concentration of purpose
upon it, underlay and dictated every step of the Navy Department from
first to last,--so far, at least, as the writer knows,--and it must be
borne in mind by any reader who wishes to pass intelligent judgment
upon the action or non-action of the Department in particular
instances.
It was this consideration that brought the _Oregon_ from the Pacific
to the Atlantic,--a movement initiated before hostilities opened,
though not concluded until after they began. The wisdom of the step
was justified not merely, nor chiefly, by the fine part played by that
ship on July 3, but by the touch of certainty her presence imparted to
the grip of our fleet upon Cervera's squadron during the preceding
month, and the consequent power to move the army without fear by sea
to Santiago. Few realize the doubts, uncertainties, and difficulties
of the sustained watchfulness which attends such operations as the
"bottling" of the Spanish fleet by Admiral Sampson; for "bottling" a
hostile fleet does not resemble the chance and careless shoving of a
cork into a half-used bottle,--it is rather like the wiring down of
champagne by bonds that cannot be broken and through which nothing can
ooze. This it is which constitutes the claim of the American
Commander-in-Chief upon the gratitude of his countrymen; for to his
skill and tenacity in conducting that operation is primarily due the
early ending of the war, the opportunity to remove our stricken
soldiery from a sickly climate, the ending of suspense, and the saving
of many lives. "The moment Admiral Cervera's fleet was destroyed,"
truly said th
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