e London "Times" (August 16), "the war was practically at
an end, unless Spain had elected to fight on to save the point of
honor;" for she could have saved nothing else by continued war.
To such successful operation, however, there is needed not only ships
individually powerful, but numbers of such ships; and that the numbers
of Sampson's fleet were maintained--not drawn off to other, though
important, operations--even under such sore temptation as the dash of
Camara's fleet from Cadiz towards the Philippines, was due to the
Department's ability to hold fast the primary conception of
concentration upon a single purpose, even though running thereby such
a risk as was feared from Camara's armored ships reaching Dewey's
unarmored cruisers before they were reinforced. The chances of the
race to Manila, between Camara, when he started from Cadiz, and the
two monitors from San Francisco, were deliberately taken, in order to
ensure the retention of Cervera's squadron in Santiago, or its
destruction in case of attempted escape. Not till that was
sufficiently provided for would Watson's division be allowed to
depart. Such exclusive tenacity of purpose, under suspense, is more
difficult of maintenance than can be readily recognized by those who
have not undergone it. To avoid misconception, it should be added here
that our division at the Philippines was not itself endangered,
although it was quite possible that Manila Bay might have to be
temporarily abandoned if Camara kept on. The movements of the monitors
were well in hand, and their junction assured, even under the control
of a commander of less conspicuous ability than that already shown by
Admiral Dewey. The return of the united force would speedily have
ensured Camara's destruction and the restoration of previous
conditions. It is evident, however, that a certain amount of national
mortification, and possibly of political complication, might have
occurred in the interim.
The necessity and the difficulty of thus watching the squadrons of an
enemy within his ports--of "blockading" them, to use a common
expression, of "containing" them, to conform to a strictly accurate
military terminology--are more familiar to the British naval mind than
to ours; for, both by long historical experience and by present-day
needs, the vital importance of so narrowly observing the enemy's
movements has been forced upon its consciousness. A committee of very
distinguished British admirals
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