Western development, and loss of a third of its tonnage by destruction
or shift to foreign register during the Civil War. At the outbreak
of that war 72 per cent of American exports were carried in American
bottoms; only 9 per cent in 1913. Thus the United States had reached
the unsatisfactory condition of a nation with a large and rapidly
growing foreign commerce and an almost non-existent merchant marine.

[Footnote 1: NAVAL STRATEGY, p. 104.]

This was the situation when the nation was thrust suddenly and
half unwillingly into the main stream of international events by
the Spanish-American War. Though this war made the United States
a world power, commercial or political aggrandizement played no
part in her entry into the struggle. It arose solely from the
intolerable conditions created by Spanish misrule in Cuba, and
intensified by armed rebellion since 1895. Whatever slight hope
or justification for non-intervention remained was destroyed by
the blowing up of the _U. S. S. Maine_ in Havana harbor, February
15, 1898, with the loss of 260 of her complement of 354 officers
and men. Thereafter the United States pushed her preparations for
war; but the resolution of Congress, April 19, 1898, authorizing
the President to begin hostilities expressly stated that the United
States disclaimed any intention to exercise sovereignty over Cuba,
and after its pacification would "leave the government and control
of the island to its people."

It was at once recognized that the conflict would be primarily
naval, and would be won by the nation that secured control of the
sea. The paper strength of the two navies left little to choose,
and led even competent critics like Admiral Colomb in England to
prophesy a stalemate--a "desultory war." Against five new American
battleships, the _Iowa, Indiana, Massachusetts, Oregon_ and _Texas_,
the first four of 10,000 tons, and the armored cruisers _Brooklyn_
and _New York_ of 9000 and 8000 tans, Spain could oppose the
battleship _Pelayo_, a little better than the _Texas_ and five
armored cruisers, the _Carlos V, Infanta Maria Teresa, Almirante
Oquendo_, and _Vizcaya_, each of about 7000 tons, and the somewhat
larger and very able former Italian cruiser _Cristobal Colon_.
Figures and statistics, however, give no idea of the actual weakness
of the Spanish navy, handicapped by shiftless naval administration,
by dependence on foreign sources of supply, and by the incompetence
and lack of train